I am not a Jew. And equally important, I do not live in Israel where the October 7th attacks have recreated memories of the past and the living reminder that the goal of many of its neighbouring countries and peoples is the elimination of Israel as a state and for some, of the Jewish people. Nor am I Palestinian, currently facing the possibility of death or injury or starvation, and I do not live in Gaza, which is being destroyed, or the West Bank, where right-wing Israeli settlers are oppressing Palestinians.
If I were Israeli, though, I would hope that I could articulate my views as does Fania Oz-Salzberger in this clip as she talks about the complicated reality of the feelings of many Israelis now and her hopes for the future.
I am not a Jew living in Israel, however; I cannot possibly experience Fania Oz-Salzberger’s extraordinary mix of anguish for the present and aspirations for the future for myself. My views about the Israel-Hamas war, the events leading up to it, the history of the creation of Israel and of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are, of course, influenced by my own situation.
I am someone who believes Israel has a right to exist. Even further, I adhere to the thesis that Israel needs to exist, as a secular sanctuary from the ill-treatment of Jews throughout history, from the requirements, for example, to live in ghettos and wear particular clothing even under so-called “benign” regimes to the Holocaust to the thread of antisemitism since and today. It is consistent with my moral values to consider the existence, the availability, of Israel a good thing. It is equally consistent with my moral values to abhor what Israel is actually doing in Gaza. And so I find my moral compass struggles to find its true direction.
And while I strongly believe in the right of Israel to exist, I also believe in an independent Palestinian state ruled by Palestinians. I am among those who remain convinced that the only answer is the two-state solution, although I realize that seems further away than ever.
Despite this, I join with many others who struggle with the ongoing war between Israel and Hamas. The very nature of war tests moral certainty. There are still events or conduct that do not pose a moral quandry for me, for which my own views are straightforward and I can identify without compunction where my own moral stance lies, for or against. However, there have been important developments that for me are more complex.
One reason for moral ambiguity, always true and perhaps especially so today, is that we cannot be sure where the truth lies. Whom can we believe? Who is lying? What is real, what is fabricated by word or AI? What is the context for a snippet of comment, for a slice of a video? What is the history that frames the current situation? That history is of course hotly contested: did it begin in 1947 (the UN partition of Palestine)? in 1917 (the Balfour Declaration)? what is the impact of 1967 (when Israel seized the West Bank, the Golan Heights, the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip in the Six-Day War)? of 2005 (when Israel withdrew from the West Bank and Palestinians subsequently elected Hamas and all that followed)? what is the significance of the existence of Arabs, Muslims and Jews in the region as far back as 2000 BCE?
The current Israel Hamas conflict is not the only event that forces us to ask these or similar questions and it is not the only one for which we cannot be sure that we always have the “right” answers, but it is certainly a situation in which truth has lost its way.
“Picking a side”, though, glosses over the complexities, forces one — forces me, at any rate — to ignore a fundamental moral code based on people’s humanity. Some things remain clear to me, but I struggle with others that are interrelated.
There is no question for me that Hamas’s attack and concomitant actions were immoral. Unlike some immediate and subsequent characterizations that their brutality was an “act of resistance”, I see them as only worthy of condemnation (see my post My Personal Response to October 7th). I’m still not conflicted or confused about that. Nor am I conflicted about my response to the denials, that seem to have arisen again recently, that Hamas raped women on October 7th (I talk about this in “When is Rape not Rape? When the Victim is Jewish“).
I also feel clear in my mind about the rightfulness of Israel’s initial incursion into Gaza. As does any country that is attacked, Israel has a right to defend itself. No gray area here. And it has a right to defend itself forcefully, to take its enemy as it finds it, an enemy that promises to repeat October 7th again and again and operates within civilian and otherwise protected infrastructure. Like it or not, war means that there will be civilian deaths and the destruction of infrastructure.
But this is where the “simple” answers end. For the Israeli prosecution of the war and its apparent plans for after the war do raise moral questions. Waging war has its limits, its rules, its differences between disciplined actions and corrupt or degenerate conduct.
I see little about how Hamas is fighting this war, although I have seen references to their shooting civilians and stealing food and other aid (see here for description of Hamas’s conduct), assertions contradicted by other observers. Given their past behaviour, I expect nothing from them. But I do have expectations about the IDF. I understood it to be a trained and disciplined army and it claims to be a moral army. Yet IDF soldiers post videos of themselves looting, humiliating detainees, playing around with Palestinian women’s intimate garments, laughing about blowing up buildings, taking great pleasure in displaying their activities to the world. I would like to argue that these acts by individual and small groups of soldiers are “rogue”, but there are too many, they are too public and it appears there is no serious, if any, effort to stop them.
These are not the acts of a disciplined and moral army and in some instances probably constitute war crimes. How well Israeli soldiers have been trained is also questionable — after all, many reservists raced to defend Israel after October 7th and there was no time for additional training, we have to assume. Too often we hear IDF soldiers feel “threatened” as an excuse for killings of unarmed civilians: for example, a sniper kills three hostages despite the hostages’ efforts to communicate who they were; soldiers fire on starving Palestinians rushing a food truck; and an Israeli sniper kills a 12 year old boy playing with a firecracker because they — the soldiers — felt “threatened” in all these cases. In the food truck calamity, over 100 Palestinians died and over 700 were injured, from a combination of IDF shooting, being run over by aid trucks seeking to escape and trampling in the chaos. (This event is a good example of how difficult it is to detect the truth of much of what is happening in the war, as Israel provides one version that minimizes their responsibility and others, including witnesses, a different version that blames Israel soldiers: see here. )
War, as I said above, and as is obvious, leads to deaths and destruction. The real immorality derives from whether the intention is to kill the population or whether, sadly, people die as a result of the “normal” operations of war that are consistent with the rules of war. Being reckless about deaths is similar to being intentional, I believe (a point made by a spokesperson for MSF describing attacks against MSF staff, buildings, vehicles). Whether the death toll Hamas reports (under the name of the Palestinian Ministry of Health) includes militants as well as civilians, and is otherwise accurate, or who are members of Hamas, far too many civilians have been sacrificed, including children, women and civilian men. Journalists, doctors and other medical personnel, teachers have all died, often with the excuse that they supported Hamas. The level and type of injuries have been abhorrent.
The number of deaths and very serious injuries, the displacements, the destruction of most of Gaza are heartbreaking and in my heart I know they are not justified.
Israel claims that it warns people living in areas it intends to bomb so that they can leave, unlike the usual practice in war. And yet at this point, much of the population has been driven south to the border with Egypt, huddled together in Rafah with nowhere else to go. That includes Egypt, which as is the case with other Arab countries, does not want Palestinian refugees. This in the face of Israel’s announced intentions to move into Rafah to destroy what they say are the remaining Hamas battalions. (Just in the last day or so, Israel has announced it will move the people in Rafah to humanitarian areas before they attack Rafah.)
Although there are disputes about whether Israel is blocking food trucks, and Israel claims it is providing aid, it is almost impossible not to conclude that Israel is making efforts to limit food and other necessities reaching Gazans, leading to starvation (and groups of Israelis block trucks at different access points for different reasons, sometimes explicitly to prevent food coming in or [with the same effect] to pressure Hamas to release the remaining hostages and the bodies of those who have died).
While I believe that Hamas has built tunnels beneath different types of buildings, putting those who live, work, learn and teach, pray and treat at risk, I do question whether the way in which Israel has destroyed so many buildings in Gaza is justified by that. I believe Israel has found tunnels, although I know that — or at least the extent that is true — is disputed.
The photos and videos of Gaza show that it has been almost completely destroyed. We know that hospitals and places of worship, off limits under the rules of war, have been attacked on the basis that they are over Hamas tunnels. What we do not know is whether the existence of tunnels under most of these protected buildings is guesswork or excuse. When Russia bombs churches, museums, schools and hospitals in Ukraine, we condemn Russia; it is true that Russia is bombing in aid of an offensive war and Israel is bombing in the course of what it meant to be a defensive war, but it cannot be ignored that the Israeli destruction of the Gaza strip has gone over the line.
More than these visuals, however, the words and decisions of significant members of the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and of the Prime Minister himself reveal the official Israeli intentions. And here I come full circle. We have known that it has been Hamas’s goal all along to eliminate Israel and with it the Jews. Now we cannot avoid the reality that the objective of the Netanyahu government is not only to eliminate Hamas, but to destroy Gaza to make it impossible for the Palestinians to live there. Bluntly, while many — including me — think the only way to respond to the Israel/Palestine dilemma is a two-state solution, that is at least as far off as it ever was. The Netanyahu government and Netanyahu himself strenuously oppose it.
Israel has long supported Israeli settlers in the West Bank, although that is against international law, and even during this war, the Netanyahu government has approved the building of more settlements. The Israeli cabinet approved 3,300 additional settlement homes in the West Bank in February of this year. It has accepted “settler” violence against the Palestinians there. Doing so has been wrong in the past and it is wrong now. What is true now, though, is that there is no pretension at all. The opposition to a two-state solution is in the forefront now and is the engine driving the prosecution of the war (other than Netanyahu’s efforts to maintain power).
The Minister for National Security of Israel, Itamar Ben-Gvir, and the Finance Minister who has also been appointed to oversee civilian life in the West Bank, Bezalel Smotrich, represent the most extreme of the views held by Israeli government officials; they have been called, properly in my view, “fanatics”. They have called for “voluntary emigration” of Palestinians. Even before October 7, 2023, Smotrich, who lives in the West Bank, “approve[d] thousands of new settlement homes, legalize[d] previously unauthorized wildcat outposts and [made] it more difficult for Palestinians to build homes and move about“. The government has said this is not their policy, but it is difficult to see how it is not.
Shane Bauer in a New Yorker detailed article about the West Bank, describes Palestinian displacement and settler violence (including against Israeli activists trying to assist Palestinians there), as well as the settler relationship with the Netanyahu government and the IDF. I am clear in my own mind, based on news over several years, and reinforced by the Bauer article, that the settler treatment of Palestinians in the West Bank, which breaches international law and, according to Bauer, Israel’s own rules, is beyond the pale. And the words, views and actions of the hardliners in the Israeli government simply confirm this. While from time to time or in relation to specific comments, Netanyahu disassociates himself from the hardliners, the reality is that they remain in government and they continue to do what they do.
(Comments by government ministers, including Netanyahu, and others in official positions have been used as evidence of genocidal intent in the case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. Although some of these statements as reported may have been misquotes or failing to understand a broader context, there are enough to make these individuals’ intention clear. It is not necessarily the intention of all Israelis, however.)
There is much more to say about how the war is being prosecuted. Increasingly, however, the thousands of deaths of Palestinians (the exact number is another “fact” that raises doubts, but we can agree it is thousands and far too many), from bullets, from being caught in the destruction of their homes and other buildings, from starvation because aid trucks are held up at the border, have led to calls for a ceasefire. We should note, however, that these calls have been made since soon after the start of the war. For example, see here for call for ceasefire by a UN official on October 14th, without a concomitant call for release of all the hostages seized by Hamas. On December 12th, the UN voted for a ceasefire and release of the hostages.
The notion of a ceasefire is a fraught concept. What do we mean by a “ceasefire”: a “permanent” end to hostilities? a pause in the fighting to allow the release of more hostages and provision of aid?
The early calls for a ceasefire forget that Hamas started this war on October 7th, when a ceasefire was in place. And when Israel had loosened border controls to allow the passage of Gazans into Israel to work. Today, however, it is, I think, fair to say that the widespread calls for a ceasefire are a response to the conditions facing Palestinians in Gaza and to the extreme destruction of infrastructure. Yet how realistic is this? Why should we expect Israel to give up when it — and we — know that Hamas will attack again?
Is there an alternative to a permanent ceasefire for those whose moral values (including me) cannot countenance what is happening in Gaza now? For some, there is not: Israel should cease fighting, it is that simple, because they are “oppressors”, they are “colonizers”; for others, their concept of a ceasefire involves Hamas releasing all the hostages and giving up their commitment to the destruction of Israel and, indeed, to renouncing their governance of Gaza. I do not ascribe to the former and, while I take the view that a permanent ceasefire must be conditional on the latter, I do not see the latter as realistic for two reasons: Hamas will not do any of that and Israel cannot trust Hamas even if it said it would do all of that.
And so we turn to a pause in the fighting: freeing hostages (Hamas seems to control how many this will be and who they will be, partly determined by whether they know where the hostages are and which hostages are still alive) in an exchange with Israeli-held Palestinian prisoners (always a greater number than those returning to Israel) and allowing aid into Gaza. A pause or temporary ceasefire of the kind we saw last November, possibly for six weeks, is now on the agenda, negotiated by those who might (emphasis on “might”) influence Israel and Hamas. Negotiations are continuing as I write.
What happens after a temporary ceasefire, if there is one? Perhaps a break will allow Israel to listen to its friends and engage in a more targeted war that avoids as much so-called “collateral damage” as possible. Given much that has happened and much that is said by government ministers, this may be wishful thinking. For at least some ministers, the phrase “from the river to the sea”, opprobrium when shouted during pro-Palestinian marches to mean the elimination of Israel, means an extended Israel, including annexing the West Bank.
Where is my moral compass pointing, then? As I said, I believe Israel has the right to defend itself, but in doing so, it must do so in accord with the modern rules of war. The government must control soldiers’ conduct and stop the hardliners’ comments and actions. Yet given the government’s own stance, it is unlikely to do that unless its friends exercise their own influence, something they seem to have difficulty doing, short of stopping arms sales to Israel, which a few countries have done (although some haven’t sent any since October 7th). Israel is destroying itself and making it impossible to defend it. The condemnation that has previously followed attacks from Israel’s enemies in the past will be muted in the future.
(There is much else that is relevant to this post: UNRWA and the significance of the different status granted Palestinian “refugees” compared to refugees generally; a fuller assessment of protests throughout Canada and elsewhere; the extensive antisemitism that has emerged from the shadows. (On this last point, I do not disagree that there has been islamophobia, too, but the statistics indicate there has been far more antisemitism in Canada and nothing compares to the pro-Palestinian/pro-Hamas demonstrations.) But it has been difficult enough to wend a path through the issues in this post, so best these other matters be left for another day.)
As long as the Netanyahu government is in power, the situation will not improve. And while that has implications beyond Israel, it is obviously an internal Israeli matter, since Israelis must decide to remove him. The war keeps Netanyahu in power, but the war as it is being run now, will also likely destroy not only Gaza, but Israel’s soul.
No one, other than the hard-line right-wing members of Israeli society can want the deaths and destruction in Gaza; unfortunately, they are the government. Like fanatics everywhere, I see them as morally bankrupt.
I see something else, too: the way antisemitism cuts deep, fostered by highly organized pro-Palestinian? pro-Hamas? protests or a mix of both those wanting to end the deaths and starvation in Gaza and those who are marching for the elimination of Israel?; how the slogans and signs in Canada, the United States and other countries too often reflect the slogans and signs of Nazi Germany; the elision between criticism of Israel’s prosecution of the war and other policies elides with denunciation of Jews: a video of a couple leaving a synagogue, walking down a street in New York, being harassed by young people; a pro-Palestinian crowd yelling and harassing people as they enter the new Holocaust Museum in Amsterdam; a contingent of Pro-Palestinian protestors blocking a Toronto overpass near a neighbourhood with many Jewish residents (an “in your face” demonstration finally ended by the police); a protest against a McGill library because of an exhibition marking the gift to the school by Moshe Safdie, architect and a Jew). Protests on Parliament Hill calling for “intifada revolution” (as the pro-Palestinian protestors at the AGO chanted “we are the infitada” in response to the leader screaming “who is the infitada”) and describing October 7th as an example of the “amazing bravery and resilience and resistance of the Palestinian people to take every step necessary to liberate every Palestinian prisoner from the jails of the Zionist regime“. (No, I haven’t forgotten “the nail-gun man” who was rightly arrested or the sale of West Bank land held at a synagogue, thereby in my view muting criticism of demonstrations outside the synagogue.)
Nor can I ignore what I accept to be true: that when it comes right down to it, Jews find themselves on their own, knowing that antisemitism, whether in words or actions, always lies below the surface, ready to burst forth and that the temptation to ensure it is kept in check is to deny the Jewish part of oneself or to hide in the shadows.
My moral compass finds its true direction (although not always the same direction) when all I’m concerned about is Hamas’s actions on October 7th, its stated intention to destroy Israel and the Jews and the need to remove Hamas from power; similarly, it quickly finds its true direction when the focus is on Israel’s right to exist and its right — its responsibility — to respond to the October 7th attack, end the threat of Hamas and bring the hostages home, reinforced by the blessing of Hamas’s actions across the world. Yet the tension caused the compass by Israel’s prosecution of the war, by the extent of death and destruction in Gaza, and the settlers in the West Bank leaves it with an erratic fluctuating needle.
The difference between a real compass and a moral compass is that even while the needle of the moral compass can identify what is right and wrong, unlike the real compass, it must also struggle with the complexity of how right can become wrong. In this case, it needs to measure the moral complexity inherent when a fitting response to brutality turns itself into a moral wrong. Moral certainty on one level must struggle with the questioning and denunciation a moral stance requires on another.